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"Energy" is a slippery word, referring to something noticeable yet 
nevertheless intangible. "Energy" may be a noun, but it refers to neither 
a solid thing like a shoe nor to an abstraction like "liberty" or "demo- 
cracy." It might be said that this noun aspires to be a verb, since it refers 
to an active, almost simultaneous, movement from one state to another. 
Energy is both a commodity and a fundamental aspect of being. Given 
this peculiar status, energy can function within a narrative as a prize to 
be won, such as ownership of a utility or Frank Cowperwood's struggle 
to control a traction company, but it also belongs to a realm of pre-con- 
ditions or choices made in fashioning a narrative design. This essay 
deals first with explicit "energy narratives" and then with the ways that 
conceptions of energy implicitly shape the pre-formation of narrative, 
concluding with a discussion of F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby. 
One caveat must be stated at the outset. I will discuss only male energy 
narratives, which characteristically concern power systems and their 
problems, growth, limits, success, and failure. A corresponding study of 
women's energy narratives would perhaps focus more on biological 
rather than mechanical metaphors. That essay would explore such 
topics as generativity and barrenness, exclusion and empowerment. 
Here, I am concerned with defining the narrative designs fashioned by 
white men, who have long dominated American politics and culture. 
Energy has not always been a central category in conceptualizing 
society or the economy, much less in the constitution of literature. 
Rather, the importance of energy emerged as part of a larger paradig- 
matic shift in scientific thought during the nineteenth century. Until the 
1840s scientists worked on the assumption that "force" was the central 
concept in defining and explaining the universe. But increasingly it 
became evident to them that "force" was a compound of empirical 
observation and popular metaphor. Beginning in the 1850s Lord Kelvin 
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and others formulated the laws of thermodynamics, which proposed a 
new model of the universe in which "energy" was a central term. Only 
later did their scientific ideas become part of the larger cultural dis- 
course, in a process that it would require a large volume to trace out. 
Suffice it to say that energy did not remain an abstract concept in 
physics, but was manifested to most people in the particular forms of 
energy that were becoming central to industrial society, most obviously 
steam engines and, later, electrical motors and dynamos. These in turn 
provided the basis for a metaphorical language of energy. A "dynamic" 
person "got up a head of steam" or "gave an electrifying performance." 
Nor was energy merely manifested in such expressions. Scientific 
thought provided successive models of the universe in which energy 
remained the key term; and industrialization relied upon a series of new 
machines that made the United States a "high energy" society. 
By the end of the nineteenth century every text contained an implicit 
conception of energy, which found expression both in terms of the indi- 
vidual and the society as a whole. The ideology of human energy 
included the perhaps inherently tragic Freudian conception of a reser- 
voir which has a limited supply but that must find an outlet; the liberal 
conception that energy can be increased if it is released from needless 
obstructions; and Henry Adams's sense that limitless energy will accele- 
rate society toward a certain doom. In short, the concept of energy was 
intimately connected to the sense of history, and was often present as a 
tacit knowledge shared between reader and writer. 
As already noted, it is useful to divide the topic into explicit and 
implicit narratives, or texts which focus overtly on energy and texts 
which contain an implied conception of it. In the implicit narrative, to 
which I will return, energy is a central part of an imagined order that 
offers a fictive resolution to ideological conflict. In the explicit form a 
particular technology, such as electric high-tension lines or a hydro- 
electric dam, may become a subject of political debate, or it may 
become a prominent part of a novel, as was the case with William 
Wister Haines' 1930s largely forgotten working-class novel, High 
Tension.1 The following survey will look at a suggestive variety of sour- 
Such reform novels were an important part of America1 culture in the early twentieth century. They were 
brought out by respected houses, including Bobbs-Merrill, Macmillan, Grosset & and Dunlap, and Little, 
Brown, and they played a role in political life. One must file a modest brief for this silenced literature, which in 
its own way is as important as unjustly forgotten work by racial and ethnic minorities. 
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ces, both famous and obscure. Just as importantly, literary works will be 
placed in a larger context that includes political speeches, advertise- 
ments, and public relations, or in short, any discourse which contains 
opinions about energy. 
11. Explicit Energy Narratives 
Four conceptions of energy underlie most explicit energy narratives. 
Any of them may seem to be true or actually be true at a given historical 
juncture. My purpose is not to determine their veracity, but rather to 
analyze their interrelations. The typology below may seem familiar to 
readers of Northrop Frye, Hayden White, or A. J. Greimas, but I will not 
attempt to harmonize their different critical positions. Rather, I will 
sketch the historical emergence of four fundamentally different energy 
narratives: comic, melodramatic, heroic, and existential.2 The diagram 
should be taken as less an analytical device than a convenience for the 
reader. The split between the horizontal axes is important, however, as it 
emphasizes a historical development. Comic and melodramatic energy 
narratives were more common in the nineteenth century, although they 
still remain popular; those focusing on technology belong almost en- 
tirely to the twentieth century, and they have only attracted a sizeable 
public in recent years. 
Figure 1. Explicit American Energy Narratives 
Abundance Limits 
Nature Comic Melodramatic 
Technology Heroic Existential 
2 On the idea of force inliterature, see Ronald E. Martin, American Literature and the Universe of Force 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1981). Were one to perform this crilical work, Frye's formulation might be 
less useful than the work of A. J. Greimas and his structuralist school. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). A. J. Greimas, St!mantique 
structurele (Paris: Larousse, 1966; Du Sens. Paris: Seuil, 1970). 
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In the classic narrative of natural abundance more energy continually 
becomes available, assuring progress, happiness, and personal success. 
This energy narrative originated in the industrial revolution, flourished 
in the nineteenth century, and remained the dominant form until after 
World War 11. During the twentieth century corporate public relations 
have been the most obvious disseminator of this narrative. Roland 
Marchand concluded that advertising in the 1920s and 1930s used 
"scores of parables and visual clich6s" to beckon "consumers to join in 
a cost-free progress toward modernity."3 For instance, General Electric 
spent millions on a campaign specifically designed to create an "electric 
consciousness." The company also disseminated this message through 
personal appearances by Charles M. Ripley, a popular lecturer. The 
indefatigable Ripley traveled the United States repeating the same talk, 
"The Romance of Power," often giving it more than once a day. Like a 
barn-storming revivalist he spread the gospel of progress through elec- 
tricity, speaking to Rotary clubs, schools, women's groups, and any 
other organization where local utilities could introduce him. So popular 
was his lecture that the 100 slides he used were reproduced in sets and 
other men were trained to give the same talk. In 1928 the whole was 
packaged as a booklet, The Romance of Power, and distributed to 
schools all over the United States. It had the following subtitles: "Travel, 
Life and Labor, Here and Abroad;" "An Illustrated Review Filled with 
Laughs and Information;" "The ABC's of Human Progress;" and 
"Pictures Showing What the World Can Learn from the United States 
and What We can Learn from the World." As might be expected, the 
rest of the world had but little to teach, but could learn a great deal from 
America. Photographs showed "primitive" people doing things by hand 
that Americans did with machines. Ripley had statistics and charts to 
prove that Americans had a higher standard of living than Great Britain, 
and he argued that the measure of this success was the use of energy. 
British factories used only one-third as much horsepower per worker as 
American factories, and, he claimed, productivity was only one-third as 
great. Moreover, the price of electricity generally was half that in 
Roland Marchand, Adverlising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940. Berkeley 
(University of Calirornia Press, 1985), p. 363. 
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England. Citing such examples, Ripley concluded his book with the 
admonition, "Young men and women, guard this mechanism [private 
power plants.] Keep the wheels turning, faster and faster, making more 
and ever more of the good things of life - for everybody."4 
Such sentiments were widely held. They could be found not only in 
corporate advertising and public relations, but just as importantly they 
were embraced by a whole spectrum of political figures from conserva- 
tive Americans to Lenin. In the United States abundance based on 
energy was given a socialist inflection by General Electric's leading 
researcher, Charles Steinmetz, who believed that electrification would 
not only increase productivity but also lead automatically to the national 
consolidation of utilities because of the interconnectedness of generation 
and transmission facilities. Their integration would create a national grid 
that only the government could effectively control. Regardless of who 
was imagined to own the electrical system, however, it was the key to 
abundance. During the 1930s corporate exhibits at the world's fairs in 
Chicago (1933-1934) and New York (1939) stressed how private owner- 
ship of energy would lead to abundance. The New Deal politicians who 
created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) shared this idea with the 
utility executives who opposed pubic power developments. Even at the 
political extremes, electricity was seen as a catalyst for abundance. Both 
the conservative Southern Agrarians and Marxists of the 1930s believed 
that increasing electrification was virtually identical with prosperity and 
progress. In short, the comic narrative was dominant for roughly a cen- 
tury, from 1840 to 1940, and has by no means lost its popularity. During 
the 1950s an updated version of Ripley's talk was purveyed by another 
General Electric public relations man, Ronald Reagan. 
The second form of explicit energy narrative, like the first, assumes 
that an abundance of energy is an unquestioned good, but it focuses on 
artificial limitations of the supply. These are usually melodramatic tales 
of good and evil, in which natural abundance is cut off and hoarded for 
personal gain. Before 1940 this view was commonly found in novels 
4 Charles Ripley, The Romance of Power (New York: National Electric Light Association, 1928). The 91 
pages of text were illuslraled with the 104 of the images used in the slide show. Archives of the National 
Museum of American History, Warshaw Collection, Box 9, pp. 66-68, 91. The majority of the images used 
still can be found in the General Electric Photographic Archives, Schenectady, New York. The role of such 
materials in public relations campaigns is discussed In chapter eight of David E. Nye, Image Worlds: Corporate 
Identities at General Electric (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985). 
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that attacked private monopolies of electrical power, which restricted 
supplies and/or kept prices high.5 There are many possible variants of 
this narrative. Some writers, both in fiction and in the periodicals, depic- 
ted public utilities as an inherent evil, claiming that compared to private 
enterprises they were generally so badly run and inefficient that they 
limited the natural abundance of energy. Seen in this perspective, 
Theodore Dreiser's The Titan concerns artificial limitations on energy 
and the hero's attempts to rationalize its use in his traction companies. 
In another variant of the narrative of limitation, short-sighted technicians 
could inadvertently create blockages in the free flow of energy. A 1940s 
novel dealing with the TVA focused on the difficulties encountered in 
evacuating backwoods people from their ancestral homes and educating 
them to accept modern ways, in order to make way for progress. As one 
character lectures an engineer, whose only concerns are technical, "If 
you were allowed to build this dam unhampered by the rest of us, it 
might provide electric power, but for whom? A malaria ridden, poverty- 
stricken, one-crop population farming burnt-out land can't buy electric- 
ity, nor can it buy the products of factories .... The more highly you 
impractical technicians industrialize a region, the wider becomes the 
gap between the articles you produce and the consumers on whom the 
ultimate success or failure of your enterprise depends, because you 
don't include all the factors in your planning. Frankly, Gordon, you're a 
starry-eyed, naive engineer."6 More commonly, of course, engineers 
were depicted as the heroes of the abundance story, as technicians with 
vision. Well before World War I, the engineer emerged as a rugged 
individualist hero in popular fiction. He was the man of action [the pro- 
fession was overwhelmingly male] who overcame obstacles, put theories 
into practice, and ensured material progress. 
While early limitation stories focused on individuals, after World War 
I1 the narrative of artificial or unnecessary limits on energy supplies 
assumed global dimensions. Frequently, it is associated with foreign 
policy, national self-interest, and the deployment of troops in the Middle 
East. In the 1970s OPEC version, the narrative focused on conflicts 
between the United States and the oil cartel. In 1990, when Saddam 
5 Alexander Otis, The Man and the Dragon (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1910). Henry George, Jr., 
The Romance of John Bainbridge (New York: Macmillan Company, 1906). 
6 Theodore Dreiser, The Tilan (New York. World Publishing Company, 1946). Eleanor Buckles, Valley of 
Power (New York: Creative Age Press. Second printing), p. 123. 
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Hussein seized Kuwait and its extensive oil fields, he was easily type- 
cast in the role as the villain who threatens the world's energy supply, 
first by seizing it and later by setting hundreds of oil wells on fire. 
The third form of the explicit energy narrative is a tale of transforma- 
tion, in which clever technicians reveal how to achieve growth, progress, 
and personal success through using new resources or recycling old 
ones. In recent times this narrative has been particularly attractive, but it 
is hardly new. Henry Ford had expressed most of its basic ideas by the 
early 1930s. He early championed recycling, the use of renewable 
resources and non-polluting forms of power generation. Ford also 
helped to enshrine Thomas Edison as one of the central figures of this 
myth, in which the scientist or engineer is the hero.7 
After 1940 atomic power began to be presented in similar terms. As a 
fuel thought to be cheap and inexhaustible, it underlay visions of a 
future world whose energy supplies would be so limitless that crops 
could be grown with artificial light underground, leaving the surface of 
the earth free for recreation. One scientist wrote in Collier's in 1940 that 
atomic energy would ensure "unparalleled richness and opportunities 
for all. Privilege and class distinctions and the other sources of social 
uneasiness and bitterness will become relics because things that make 
up the good life will be so abundant and inexpensive." The same year, 
The Saturday Evening Post called uranium "a miraculous new continent 
of matter, as rich and wonderful in its way as the Americas proved to be 
years after their discovery," and spoke of "the Promised Land of Atomic 
Energy." The apparent discovery of "cold fusion" generated a similar 
excitement at the end of the 1980s. 
While such heady visions have receded, the basic narrative form 
remains common. More recent versions stress the development of new 
energy sources such as solar power to replace the fossil fuels which are 
either running out or potentially unobtainable, the adoption of more 
energy-efficient housing designs, and the installation of low-energy 
appliances.8 In such narratives there are no immediate limits to growth if 
7 On Henry Ford's energy views, see David E. Nye, Henry Ford: Ignorant Idealist (New York: Kennikat 
Press, 1979), Chapter 4. 
8 Collier's and The Saturday Evening Post quotations from Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell, Rory 
O'Connor, Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America (Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982). 
Amory Lovins and L. Unter Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security (Andover, Mass.: 
Brick House Publishing, 1982), pp. 18-20. 
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one uses appropriate technologies. Economist Robert L. Heilbroner 
stressed in the 1970s that, "Given enough power, which nuclear energy 
now begins to promise us, we could literally 'melt' the rocks and 
reconstitute any substance by synthetic processes .... the long-term future 
holds out much more promise than the anti-growth school of thought 
reveals."9 
In some versions of the transformation narrative, mastering energy 
through technology leads to human transformation. Edison subscribed 
to the view that the introduction of lighting into communities not only 
kept people awake longer but quickened their intellectual and social 
development. Matthew Luckiesh, one of General Electric's leading light- 
ing researchers during the 1920s and 1930s, tried to document similar 
theories scientifically.lo In the 1980s, Murray Melbin, a sociologist, 
expressed a related view in Night as Frontier: Colonizing the World 
After Dark. Melbin argued that people in post-industrial societies lived 
in a fundamentally new situation, where life no longer obeyed the diur- 
nal rhythms of night and day. Rather, life continued around the clock 
without interruption, creating a new social environment characterized by 
"incessance." He concluded, 
Our characters and our bodies are changing and becoming suited to the particulars of inces- 
sance. Being reared in a more wakeful household, accelerating the timetable of maturation, 
hormonal levels in the blood being less conducive to drowsiness, and practices of repeat- 
edly recombining in personal relationships, all contribute to a better fit between persons and 
nighttime undertakings. Social, biological, and psychological processes have combined to 
transform us in ways to fit the environment we refashioned, and the community is being 
stocked with people who are more comfortable with its timetable. Along with altering our 
milieu, we are altering ourselves.ll 
In stark contrast to such transformative stories, the existential narrative 
of absolute limitation offers a bleaker prospect, and does not blame 
human agents for deficiencies, but presents energy scarcity as a fact of 
nature, based on scientific principles. The first law of thermodynamics is 
9 Robert L. Heilbroner, "Growth and Survival," Dialogue, Winler, 1973. [Published by the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 1972, reprinted in Dialogue.] 
10 For example, see Matthew Luckiesh, Artificial Sunlight: Combining Radiation for Health and Light for 
Vision. (New York: Van Nostrand Company, 1930.) Edison's views of the social effects of the electric light in 
"Edison's Prophecy: A Duplex, Sleepless, Dinnerless World," ~ i t ' e r a r ~  ~ i ~ e s t ,  Nov. 14, 1914, pp. 966-968. 
11 Murray Melbin, Night as Frontier: Colonizing the World After Dark (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 
p. 127. 
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that the sum total of all the energy in the universe always remains con- 
stant, but the second law (that on entropy) states that due to small losses 
that occur whenever any conversion of energy takes place, an ever- 
increasing amount of energy becomes unavailable to man. These laws 
led Lord Kelvin, who helped formulate them, to predict the gradual heat 
death of the universe. Such speculations encouraged a romantic pes- 
simism in some popular writing at the end of the nineteenth century, a 
view also common in recent science fiction. Often the central figure 
must come to terms with limits, such as the computer whiz kid Fisher in 
Paul Theroux's 0 - Z o n e . 1 2  
Alternately, in some novels the capitalists themselves are forced to 
recognize the limits of possible expansion. As early as the 1930s, 
Bloodbird, a now forgotten novel by Thomas Burton, pits the Winthrop 
family which plans to build a hydroelectric dam, against "the valley 
farmers" whose lands will be sacrificed to the project.13 Melodramatic 
narratives of artificial limits had been concerned primarily with 
reforming the city; Burton suggests that the still unredeemed city 
threatened the well-being of the countryside as well. A utility manager 
explains, "With a series of big dams we can begin to flood and store up 
enough cheap water power for our turbines to knock out all competi- 
tion. Then we can make our own rates."14 The utility buys out some 
farmers and forces others out through bankruptcy proceedings. At the 
cost of one man's life, it disrupts a political rally organized by the 
remaining farmers. Against such ruthlessness the farmers prove helpless. 
Halfway through the novel their candidate has lost the election and they 
lose an appeal in the court. One by one they are beaten, until only two 
men remain. The dam itself is underway, and its construction devastates 
the valley. Bloodbird thus inverts the comic narrative, emphasizing the 
human and natural costs of power generation. In this world of natural 
limits the farmers are associated with the idealized Jeffersonian world of 
subsistence farming and individualism. They look back to the pre-indus- 
trial period for values and standards, and ultimately the novel will vindi- 
cate their point of view. The stock market crashes, undermining the utili- 
ty's economic position and paralyzing work on the dam. Then the 
Winthrop's town burns to the ground, a victim of its own shoddy water 
12 Paul Theroux, 0-Zone (London: Penguin, 1987). See Martin op. cit., pp. 27-29, andpassim. 
13 Thomas Burton, (Stephen Longstreet, psued.), Bloodbird (New York: Smith and Durrell, 1941). 
14 Ibid., p. 88. 
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pipes that freeze because they are substandard. The conflagration is pre- 
sented as a natural event. Unlike the discursive universe of the 
Progressive political novel, men are not powerful actors who can shape 
events to their will; rather, they work within limits dictated by nature. 
As this 1930s novel suggests, the narrative of limits has long been an 
alternative to the Hamiltonian vision of unlimited expansion, and can be 
traced back to Thomas Jefferson, who argued that the United States 
should remain an agricultural nation and should not urbanize or indus- 
trialize. Similar narratives are assumed in much of the literature of ecol- 
ogy, and they are implicit in the "small is beautiful" movement that 
emerged in the 1970s. It, like Bloodbird, focuses on the hazards of poor 
design and stresses finite limits to technological growth.15 Perhaps 
because Jimmy Carter became president during these years, and no 
doubt because he was the only recent president who knew much about 
the laws of thermodynamics, he often plotted America's energy future in 
the terms of this narrative. Admittedly, he also at times presented 
Americans with narratives of technical transformation, emphasizing "the 
long range development of alternate forms of energy." But with his 
training as an engineer and as a nuclear submarine commander, Carter 
saw clearly the problems with nuclear energy, and he also realized that 
alternative energy sources such as wind and solar power would not be 
available in large quantity any time soon. 
In this dilemma, Carter turned to a more existential view. In 1977, he 
declared, "The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if 
we do not act quickly. It is a problem we will not be able to solve in the 
next few years, and it is likely to get progressively worse through the 
rest of this century. Our decision about energy will test the character of 
the American people.. .[it] will be the moral equivalent of war."l6 Sitting 
in the White House with the heat turned down, Carter exhorted 
Americans to perceive themselves as part of a dogged, heroic struggle 
that would require a decades-long fight, to overcome their own weak- 
ness (over-consumption) and dependence (on foreign oil). The truth of 
15 E. F. Schurnacher, Small i s  Beautiful: Economics as $People Mattered (New York: Harper and Row, 
1973). 
16 Televised speech, April 18, 1977. Quoted in Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (London: Collins, 1982). For 
an overview of Carter energy initiatives in the early years and how they became bogged down in Congress and 
were only party passed into law, see M. Glenn Abemathy, et al. The Carter Years (London: Francis Pinter, 
1984), pp. 14-19. 
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this narrative appeared to be confirmed by the long lines at the gas 
pumps, the rising cost of oil, and the simultaneous stagnation and infla- 
tion in the American economy. 
This narrative of an overwhelming, long-term crisis, dictated by an 
absolute limit in the energy supply, which demanded sacrifices, "did not 
play well in Peoria." Candidate Ronald Reagan campaigned success- 
fully against Carter's scenario of suffering and hardship. In his accep- 
tance speech at the Republican National Convention of 1980, he refused 
to acknowledge that real energy shortages even existed. Instead, he 
redefined Carter's program as a narrative of artificial limitation, in which 
over-zealous regulation had strangled the free market. 
Those who preside over the worst energy shortage in our history tell us to use less, so that 
we will run out of oil, gasoline, and natural gas a little more slowly.. .. But conservation is 
not the sole answer to our energy needs. America must get to work producing more energy. 
The Republican program for solving economic problems is based on growth and productiv- 
ity. Large amounts of oil, coal, and natural gas lie beneath our land and off our shores, un- 
touched because the present Administration seems to believe the American people would 
rather see more regulation, more taxes, and more controls, than more energy.l7 
Two months later, in Cleveland, Reagan compressed this message into 
the following lines: "The truth is America has an abundance of energy. 
But the policies of this administration consistently discouraged its dis- 
covery and production." He promised to "get America producing 
again" and concluded, "Every available resource we have must be used 
to free us from OPEC's domination."lg Reagan had conflated Carter's 
policies with those of the oil cartel, without explicitly saying so, by 
depicting both as parts of a narrative of limitation.19 After the election he 
acted to make oil as abundant as possible in the short term. He appoin- 
ted James Watt as his Secretary of the Interior, who loosened controls 
on leasing oil and natural gas on federal lands and in off-shore areas. 
Reagan was also fortunate. Shortly after he came to office, OPEC's 
efforts to control prices broke down, the price of oil dropped precipi- 
tously, and his predictions of abundance almost immediately came true. 
By 1985 the price of a barrel of oil was less than half what it had been in 
17 Ronald Reagan, Acceptance Speech, July 17, 1980. Transcript In New York Tzmes, July 18, 1980. 
18 Cleveland speech, 10 Septcmber, 1980, Facts on Fzle, 1980, p. 699. 
19 There IS another lnterestmg category, which one might call narratives of transcendence, which are closely 
related lo those of hm~tatlon In thls connecuon, see Allen Glnsburg's poem, "Pluton~an Ode." 
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1980. During his first administration he had begun to build up a 
"Strategic Petroleum Reserve," but these purchases were cut by more 
than 50% in his second administration, because they no longer seemed 
necessary. 
By 1985 the comic narrative of abundant energy that had flourished 
since the nineteenth century enjoyed a resurgence. It still seemed justi- 
fied by the history of American economic growth from a small agricultu- 
ral society to an industrial power, and it remained congenial to most of 
the American public. The assumption that energy ought to be naturally 
abundant is especially suited to a liberal, laissez-faire ideology, in which 
the self-reliant individual has only to make use of his own energies, 
which by extension include natural energy as well, in order to rise in the 
world. Ronald Reagan emphasized the appeal of this narrative by invok- 
ing the contrasting possibility of the melodramatic narrative, in which 
the free market is thwarted by unnatural agencies. 
Within both the comic and the melodramatic forms, machines are part 
of a transcendental vision of technology as a benign extension of the 
natural world. In contrast, the explicitly technological narratives [the 
heroic and the existential] recognize at the outset a tension between 
nature and industrialization, which it presents as a potentially dangerous 
incursion into the biosphere. They seek to resolve this tension, either by 
increasing the energy that can be extracted from the same resources, or 
by recycling. While such narratives began to appear by the end of the 
nineteenth century, they were not taken seriously by a large public until 
the 1970s. Both narrative forms were well-represented in the debate 
spurred by the Club of Rome's publication of The Limits of Growth, and 
both have been prominent in the debates on global warming and the 
degree of deterioration of the ozone layer.20 
20 Donella H. Meadows, el al., The Limits to Growth (London: Pan Books, 1972). The book sold widely in 
the United Slates and had gone through five printings in England by 1979. 
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111. Modernism and Implicit Energy Narratives 
We have seen how energy has been variously conceived, underwriting 
contrasting narratives that provide scenarios for social and economic 
decisions. Yet this four-part typology hardly exhausts the subject of 
energy narratives. It has a mechanical feel about it and is too static and a 
priori, treating energy as an economic and political factor and under- 
standing it as an object, rather than seeing it as an underlying dynamic 
force that takes various forms in different historical periods. To under- 
stand energy as a factor in literary works, it must be grasped as a chang- 
ing category of human experience, not merely as an object of political 
debate. In complex literature energy is not usually a possession to be 
fought over, nor is it usually an abstraction that an author takes an ex- 
plicit attitude toward, nor is it merely a matter of categorization, in 
which pre-conceived narrative structures provide varying accounts of 
social experience. To discuss energy in relation to literary form, the 
scheme presented so far is inadequate, because it suggests that narra- 
tives neatly correspond with ideological positions and historical time 
periods. 
A work using modernist techniques of narration might be expected to 
adopt either the heroic or more probably the existential narrative form, 
but in fact it can just as easily embrace the natural abundance of the 
comic plot. For example, in 1929 a novel on the public utility question 
employed the modernist form of multiple narration but nevertheless was 
a reworking of the earlier comic and melodramatic modes. In Chains of 
Lightning Johnathan Brooks uses five different narrators to tell the story 
of how Jason M. Wheeler's electrical utility empire comes under 
political attack. These narrators represent different shades of political 
opinion and different degrees of technical knowledge, ranging from a 
wealthy conservative housewife with no scientific knowledge, to a state 
political boss, to a populist midwestern Senator, to a hypocritical advo- 
cate of municipal reform, to the Senator's daughter, who poses as a 
secretary working for one of Wheeler's private utilities. This multiple 
narration suggests how public discourse on electrification had fragmen- 
ted during the late 1920s when utilities came under a massive federal 
investigation that lead to thousands of pages of damning testimony and 
many calls for nationalizing the industry. The possible tensions between 
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these narrators are not fully expressed, however, because the novel 
oversimplifies their differences of opinion. In its discursive universe 
Wheeler alone has the truth, and the plot revolves around the education 
of the other characters, so that they each in turn must admit their pre- 
vious ignorance. 
Wheeler, "an early employee of Thomas A. Edison," is a typical libe- 
ral hero, a tireless self-made multi-millionaire, whom his family cannot 
stop from working, "any more than we could stop a dynamo without 
absolutely disconnecting it."2l Wheeler's achievements are threatened, 
however, by a group of politicians who call for nationalization of the 
electrical industry. Their spokesman declares: "The elemental force of 
electricity is not a private plaything. You men who have chained the 
lightnings to do your will must mold that will to the public needs. If not, 
we will forge new chains, not for the lightnings, but for you men who 
have chained the lightnings!"22 The metaphor of chaining lightning, 
which is also in the book's title, immediately suggests that energy is 
natural and abundant, and that the plot will turn on the question of who 
should control the electrical system. 
Since the system itself is an unquestioned good, the problem is one of 
ensuring that it is in virtuous hands. The novel vindicates private owner- 
ship, while the politicians who oppose it are revealed to be either hope- 
lessly idealistic or venal. The novel is a treatise on the inevitable corrup- 
tion and inefficiency of public administration. As Wheeler explains to 
the Senator who at first opposed him, "my dear Senator.. .[public owner- 
ship of utilities] has been tried over and over again. My company got its 
start in life taking over municipal electric plants that had failed. These 
plants owed money for machinery, cable, equipment of all kinds, and 
were running in debt day after day."23 
Yet if Chains of Lightning is an explicit energy narrative that is ulti- 
mately an apologia for private utilities, its use of multiple points of view 
is a symptom of the breakdown of the moral consensus so conspicuous 
in the progressive politics of 1900. Compared to reform novels written 
21 Jonathan Brooks, Chains of Lightning (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1929), pp. 61, 11. 
Likewise in Bloodbird there is no suitable daughter figure in the Winthrop family whom the progressive hero 
might marry to resolve the underlying conflict. As if to emphasize this absence, he marries a doctor's daughter, 
and romance plays no role in reconciling social classes or overcoming political tensions. 
22 Ibid., p. 89. 
23 Ibid., p. 75. Also see pp. 290-295, where Wheeler calls for Cederal utility regulation. 
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twenty years earlier, romance plays a negligible role in its universe; 
attention has shifted instead to the utilities themselves, seen from multi- 
ple perspectives. Despite its appearance of modernism, Chains of 
Lightning belongs to the ideological world of naturalism, the literary 
mode appropriate to the steam-engine. In both modes of production, lit- 
erary and industrial, all the moving parts are clearly visible. A naturalist 
plot structure, with its characters securely linked together in a sequence 
of actions, resembles the steam-driven factory, with its clearly articulated 
system of belts and gears. The world of the steam-driven factory may 
have been large, but it was technologically limited in size. The shafts, 
belts, and gears could only extend so far, and the energy system of the 
whole was transparent to all observers. It was a system of unambiguous 
cause and effect, where the relations between owners and employees 
were clear. 
In contrast, the electrified factory expressed a modernist aesthetic, not 
only in its elongated, functionalist architecture, but in its interior articu- 
lations of power. Instead of a central power source from which emana- 
ted all the drive shafts, the new energy source was flexible and invisible, 
and it could be transmitted anywhere. The form of the factory was no 
longer limited by the capacity of shafts and belts to carry power over 
distances. Rather, the form became infinitely flexible, as all spaces 
became equal, and it could be expanded over a much greater area. The 
changes in scale were likewise facilitated by the interposition of tele- 
phones, loudspeakers, and other electrical communication devices 
between managers and workers. Most important of all, workers ceased 
to experience work as a series of coherent steps leading to a finished 
product that they could make from start to finish. Instead, they repeated 
a single task endlessly, as the assembly line required simultaneous work 
on everything at once. Homogenization of space and simultaneity in 
time were likewise the conceptual underpinning of much modernist 
writing. In short, the shift from one energy system to another, from 
steam to electricity, provided a whole new conceptual and experiential 
framework.24 
The implicit energy narratives of the 1920s register this shift from one 
energy system to another, just as the final form of a building is implied 
24 In part this framework has already been examined in Stephen Kern's The Culture of Space and Time 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1983. 
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in the foundation and scaffolding that enclosed it when under construc- 
tion. Pierre Macherey wrote about such unacknowledged frameworks in 
A Theory of Literary Production: 
the [literary] work is articulated in relation to the reality from the ground of which it 
emerges: not a 'natural' empirical reality, but that intricate reality in which men - both writ- 
ers and readers-live, that reality which is their ideology. The work is made on the ground 
of this ideology, that tacit and original language: not to speak, reveal, translate or make 
explicit this language, but to make possible that absence of words without which there 
would be nothing to say. We should question the work as to what it does not and cannot 
say, in those silences for which it has been made.. .. The order which it professes is merely 
an imagined order, projected on to disorder, the fictive resolution of ideological conflicts.. .. 
The work derives its form from this incompleteness which enables us to identify the active 
presence of a conflict at its bordex25 
What then are the ideological conflicts created by the shift from one 
energy system to another? And how do these conflicts create the uneven 
ground of literary experimentation? 
Consider the the deployment of millions of lights in Times Square, 
and the transformation of the city into an electric landscape. The Great 
White Way was a universe of signs that proclaimed not only particular 
made-made products but the creation of a new landscape. For the mil- 
lions of tourists who came to stare at them in Times Square, the signs 
only incidentally advertised an array of products. They came to see the 
sheer size and magnificence of the flashing signs; they were engulfed in 
a restless crowd and the roar of the city. This electric landscape, even 
more than the new electrified factories, was the cultural ground from 
which modernism sprang. From one point of view its presence signified 
the standardization of products, the use of advertising as a means of 
mass persuasion, the power of large corporations, and technology as an 
unquestioned good. But for the artist and the writer, the landscape's 
chaotic brilliance expressed an implicit ideology that valued simultane- 
ity, fragmentation, and montage. This new electric landscape stamped 
itself upon the imagination, and became a central part of the intricate 
topography of modernist experience. It remains, then, to examine one 
well-known text to see how this analysis might prove useful. 
25 Pierre Macherey,A Theory ofLiterary Production (London: Routledge, & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 155. 
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The Great Gatsby is an exemplary implicit energy narrative, for Gatsby 
uses electricity as a tool of self-creation.26 One of Carraway's first 
attempts to describe him is as an electrical machine capable of sensing 
seismic disturbances. Gatsby controls his bootlegging and illegal bond 
sales using electrical technologies, the telegraph and telephone, which 
permit him to keep track of far-flung operations while appearing to be a 
rich man of leisure. These technologies allow him, in effect, to be simul- 
taneously in several places at once, which is to say that he can be 
several persons at once. The butler need only call him away to the 
phone for a moment, and he enters one of the silences of the text, the 
unheard conversations with his underworld connections. It is hardly a 
flaw in the novel that we only hear a fragment or two from these phone 
calls. What we do hear establishes what sort of activities Gatsby is moni- 
toring and directing. These silences only hide the specific content of his 
illegal activities; more importantly, they are the surface beneath which 
he can devise multiple identities. 
Nick encounters these many identities at the lavish parties held on 
Gatsby's spacious lawn, where his servants erect "enough colored lights 
to make a Christmas tree of Gatsby's enormous garden." The lights 
transform the home's appearance, inviting guests to attend the parties as 
though they were at Coney Island or on Broadway. The guests include 
actors, producers, and singers from the entertainment world. The elabo- 
rate party lights are not only Gatsby's advertisement of himself to the 
world at large but they create a world where illusion and reality blend. 
At ths same time, these lights, like those on the Great White Way, are an 
advertisement sent across the bay to Daisy. The lights proclaim him to 
her, and in his imagination the green light at the end of her dock is a 
winking response. 
On one occasion Gatsby puts on all the lights in his house to "glance 
into a few rooms," as if by making them more intensely visible his suc- 
cess will become more real. The closer Gatsby comes to regaining 
Daisy, the more intensely they shine, culminating on the night when he 
26 F. Scott Filzgerald, The Great Gatsby (Hammondsworlh: Penguin, 1964). On electrification see pp. 42, 
45, 79, 108, 171. Electrical lighting also is prominent in some of Fitzgerald's short fiction, and it is central in 
the pre-formation of John Dos Passos' Manhattan Transfer. 
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has finally arranged a meeting, when they are at their brightest. 
Carraway recalls, "Two o'clock and the whole corner of the peninsula 
was ablaze with light, which fell unreal on the shrubbery and made thin 
elongating glints upon the roadside wires. Turning a corner, I saw that it 
was Gatsby's house, lit from tower to cellar." This was to be his last 
great display. After he has recovered Daisy, Gatsby ceases to exaggerate 
himself through electricity, and attempts to retire into a private life. With 
Daisy by his side he no longer needs to hold the parties, and "the lights 
in his house failed to go on one Saturday night - and, as obscurely as it 
had begun, his career as Trimalchio was over." In effect, Gatsby wishes 
to give up his split existence, divided between social pretense, half-con- 
fidences to Carraway, deals with the underworld, and a secret romantic 
love for Daisy. At the book's outset he had achieved what might be 
called a cubist personality, which Carraway can only begin to see from 
many perspectives. Once he regains Daisy, however, he appears to want 
a single whole identity, like a character in a realist novel. He hires new, 
unfriendly servants that ward off the public, and he tries to retire from a 
public role. Of course Gatsby cannot, as Carraway tries to tell him, turn 
the clock back to an earlier time. He cannot become an unambiguous 
character in the world of realism, with its gears and belts of cause and 
effect that ensure a logical plot. Instead, his identities become entangled 
with Tom's deceptions, which also rely considerably on the electrical 
technology of the telephone. Wilson kills Gatsby in what might be 
called a case of mistaken identity, but which more accurately is an out- 
come of multiplying identities and self-deceptions. Wilson is doggedly 
naturalistic, a man with only one identity. Gatsby deploys himself as a 
multiple character, based on the simultaneity, pretense, and social dis- 
play that electrical technologies make possible, generating endless 
rumors about himself. Because he is fragmented, he can make intermit- 
tent and startling appearances in the novel, like a great advertisement 
blinking on the Great White Way. He is entertaining for a season, but 
soon is emptied of content, burns out, and must be replaced.27 
As The Great Gatsby demonstrates, implicit energy narratives which 
do not appear to have anything to do with energy, may register the shift 
from one system to another. They can contain the tension between two 
27 For background see David E. Nye, Electr6ying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), particularly Chapter 2, "The Great White Way," and Chapler 5, "Flexible 
Factory ." 
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systems of values, experiences, and metaphors, the one based on steam- 
power, cause-and-effect, the gears of the clock, and self-control, the 
other based on electrification, simultaneity, and a self in fragments. In 
early life Gatsby attempts to shape himself into a Franklinesque charac- 
ter who can make his way by force of character, but this attempt is 
doomed to failure in a discontinuous, electrified world. Likewise, the 
famous "wasteland" landscape between Long Island and New York 
takes on additional resonance when understood as part of an energy 
narrative. Literally, it is a pointed reminder of the wastefulness of the 
high-energy society, the entropic result of making power. Looking at 
this landscape, Wilson sells energy at his gas station; he is always tired, 
as lacking in energy as the grey world of ashes. Figuratively, this 
borderland isolates him and his nineteenth-century notions of personal 
advancement, and i t  mocks his demand for a literal cause-and-effect 
explanation, or a motive, to explain the death of his wife. Nick Carraway 
presents quite a different case. He has given up on the old universe of 
force and self-creation, which for him is located only in the past that he 
evokes on the last page of the novel. Only when the lights have been 
turned off along the shore does he imagine the inexpressible wonder of 
Dutch sailors who looked out at the fresh green breast of America. 
Nostalgically, he begins to rewrite the comic energy narrative, imagin- 
ing the promise of abundance in an orgiastic future, symbolized by a 
green light. But realizing the impossibility of this narrative, his text 
breaks off in an ellipsis, falling back into the silence from which which it 
has been made. 
